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Abstract 
 
Market-oriented economic policies—reflected in limited economic activity by government, 
protection of private property rights, a sound monetary policy, outward orientation regarding 
trade and efficient tax and regulatory policy—have been strongly linked to faster rates of 
economic growth.  Foreign aid is often provided in the belief that it encourages liberalizing 
reforms in these areas.  This paper analyzes the impact of aid on market-liberalizing policy 
reform, correcting for the possible endogeneity of aid.  Results indicate that higher aid slowed 
reform over the 1980-2000 period, as measured by a broad index of policies.  Disaggregating 
policy into five areas, aid is significantly linked to slower reform in some policy areas but not in 
others.  Disaggregating by decade, aid’s adverse impact on policy reform is much more 
pronounced for the 1980s than for the 1990s.        
 
JEL: O10, O19 
   1 
1.  Introduction 
Foreign aid often is intended by donors to improve the policy environment for 
private sector development in recipient nations by encouraging market liberalization.  
Several authors have argued, however, that aid can perversely delay or even reverse 
policy reform (e.g. Rodrik, 1996; Kapur and Webb, 2000).  This study attempts to 
provide a more comprehensive test of aid’s policy impact, using summary measures of 
market-oriented economic policies and institutions.  Donors’ aid allocations may 
intentionally favor recipients with better (or improving) policies and institutions.  
Alternatively, donors may respond to economic or humanitarian crises, produced or 
aggravated by poor policies, by increasing aid flows.  Our tests therefore correct for the 
likely endogeneity of aid.  Results indicate that aid on balance significantly retards rather 
than encourages market-oriented policy reform over the 1980-2000 period.  
Disaggregating economic freedom into five broad policy areas, we find aid slows reform 
in some areas but not in others.  Disaggregating by decade, we find the negative effects of 
aid are much stronger in the 1980s than in the 1990s.   
Section 2 of the paper briefly establishes the importance of market-oriented 
policies and institutions, by reviewing evidence on their links to growth.  Section 3 
summarizes arguments and evidence on the effect of foreign aid on policy reform.  
Section 4 describes the data used in the empirical analysis, with results presented in 
section 5.  Implications of our findings are discussed in section 6. 
2. Market Liberalization and Growth 
Various studies have analyzed the growth effects of selected aspects of market-
oriented public policies, including the security of property rights (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 
1995; Claessens and Laeven, 2003), openness to trade (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Frankel 
and Romer, 2000), low inflation (Fischer, 1993; Barro, 1997), government expenditures 
and debt (Barro, 1991; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993), and labor and product market 
regulation (Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2005). Multi-dimensional indicators of market-
oriented policies have been used in other growth studies, such as Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), who construct a policy index from data on the budget surplus, inflation, and the 
Sachs-Warner openness dummy.   
An even broader index of market-oriented policy, developed by the Fraser 
Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2004), has been used extensively in empirical studies of   2 
growth.  Fraser’s “economic freedom” index
1 is based on numerous specific policy 
indicators, which are grouped into several  categories, and weighted to create an overall 
index value.  Over time, the index has been updated by including additional countries and 
components, re-arranging category groupings, altering weights, and relaxing its former 
exclusion of subjective measures.  A recent comprehensive review by Berggren (2003) 
finds with one exception (Heckelman and Stroup 2000) that each of 18 studies shows a 
positive relationship between the Fraser index (measured in changes and/or levels) and 
national rates of income growth.  These studies have used different versions of the index, 
as well as different samples and statistical techniques, so the consistency of findings 
suggests the result to be robust.  Each of the studies considered by Berggren, with again 
only one exception (Goldsmith 1997), included both developed and developing nations in 
their samples.   
While these studies suggest that market-oriented policy, broadly defined and 
measured,  is conducive to growth, some of these same studies find that not all of the 
different measures comprising the Fraser index have significant effects on growth.  Using 
the original set of 14 freedom components for 1980, Heckelman and Stroup (2000) find 
only four of the components to be positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level) 
in a series of bivariate regressions for growth over the following ten-year interval.  
Moreover, only one of these four components, and one additional component, is positive 
and statistically significant in a regression including multiple components.  Another 
component was found to be negative and statistically significant for growth, in both 
bivariate and multivariate regressions.  Ayal and Karras (1998) report the average value 
for eight components from 1975-1990 to be significantly and positively correlated with 
growth during the same time interval, and only one of these components loses its 
significance when controlling for ending year GDP, population, and investment to GDP 
ratio.
2   
The identical time intervals for the economic freedom values and growth period in 
Ayal and Karras (1998) make it difficult to determine the avenue of causation.  A similar 
problem plagues the study by Carlsson and Lundström (2002), who use a more recent 
iteration of the Fraser index.  They find that only two of the seven categories used to 
                                                 
1 The term “economic freedom” suggests a libertarian philosophy; the Cato Institute is a co-publisher of the 
Fraser Institute’s reports on economic freedom, and Milton Friedman has been a long-term advisor on the 
project.  However, the content of the index closely matches the “Washington Consensus” set of market-
oriented policy prescriptions often associated with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of International Affairs.  See Williamson (2000).  The policy areas and 
measures covered by the Fraser index also overlap largely with the classifications and measures of “market-
oriented reforms” in Loayza and Soto (2003). 
2 One of the original components is not included in their analysis, but no explanation is given for its 
absence.   3 
construct this index are robustly positively related to growth, while two other categories 
are robustly negatively related to growth.  Again, the overlapping nature of their sample 
periods of 1970 to 1990 for average freedom values and 1975 to 1995 for the growth 
period make determining causality a problem.
3  While Dawson (2003) finds that this 
version of the Fraser index Granger-causes growth, he concludes that only two of the 
categories can be said to Granger-cause growth, one of the categories is jointly 
determined with growth, and another is Granger-caused by growth. 
Collectively, these studies indicate that economic freedom, broadly defined and 
measured, contributes importantly to growth.  A major objective of foreign aid is to 
encourage market-oriented reforms that encourage growth.  In contrast to the literature on 
market-oriented policies and growth, evidence on the impact of aid on policies is 
relatively sparse.  The remainder of this paper investigates this question using the Fraser 
index, and taking into account the finding from the growth studies using this index that 
some policy areas may matter more than others. 
3.  Aid and Market-Oriented Policy Reform  
Aid can affect policies in several ways.  First, aid relationships typically create 
opportunities for donor staff to offer policy advice, either informally or in the form of 
technical cooperation.
4  Although knowledge of the theoretical and empirical arguments 
for market-oriented policies are non-excludable public goods, aid relationships are 
nevertheless likely to increase the exposure of government officials in developing 
countries to this knowledge.  Moreover, detailed policy advice and technical assistance 
are often required to help apply this knowledge, e.g. in the case of legal and judicial 
reform.   
Second, in recent years some donors have allocated aid on the principle of 
selectivity, i.e. favoring recipients which have already achieved a more favorable policy 
environment for growth.  Most notably, the World Bank’s International Development 
Association (IDA) lends about $7 billion per year to its poorest members on highly 
concessionary terms, with allocations based in large part on the Bank’s assessments of 
the quality of policies and public sector management.  The U.S. Millenium Challenge 
Account similarly is based on a system for assessing the policies and institutions of poor 
countries, with the aim of directing aid to governments that “rule justly, invest in their 
                                                 
3 Although they were able to reject endogeneity of the economic freedom index using a Hausman test, they 
did not conduct similar tests on any of the separate categories comprising the index. 
4 “Virtually all planned [World] Bank country operations” including investment projects, diagnostic 
studies, etc. as well as adjustment lending “have policy reform objectives” (World Bank, 2004: 10).    4 
people, and encourage economic freedom.”
5  Selectivity of this sort can increase the 
incentives of developing-country governments to implement market-oriented reforms, in 
order to increase their aid allocations.  The prospect of increased aid encourages reform, 
resulting in actual aid increases. 
A more traditional approach often associated with the international financial 
institutions (IFIs) is policy conditionality, often attached to “structural adjustment” loans.  
A consensus has emerged in recent years that conditionality of this type has been 
ineffectual (Easterly, 2005; Kapur and Webb, 2000; World Bank, 1998; Collier, 1997).  If 
countries have to be bribed to reform in the first place, they have every incentive to 
implement the reforms to the minimum extent necessary to gain release of funds, and 
then to reverse the reforms – with the possibility of promising these same reforms again 
in the future in exchange for additional aid.  In one frequently-cited example: “during a 
15-year period, the Government of Kenya sold the same agricultural reform to the World 
Bank four times, each time reversing it after receipt of the aid” (Collier, 1997: 60 [italics 
in original]).  In another, the IMF and World Bank made 22 loans to Pakistan between 
1970 and 1997 tied to budget deficit reductions, which repeatedly failed to materialize 
(Mallaby, 2004: 182).  Several recent World Bank and IMF studies have concluded that 
policy reform is driven primarily by domestic political economy considerations, and that 
conditionality is likely to be effective only in the early stages of reform, when it can 
bolster the position of reform advocates in government (World Bank, 2004; Devarajan, 
Dollar and Holmgren, 2001: ch. 1; Ivanova et al., 2003). 
Often, the logic of adjustment lending is that recipient governments can use aid 
funds to compensate politically-powerful groups who would suffer, at least in the short 
run, from policy and institutional reforms.  Aid can in effect purchase their acquiescence 
to liberalizing reforms, increasing the survival probability of reform-minded 
governments.  However, aid can also help non-reforming governments survive, by 
reducing the cost of not reforming (Rodrik, 1996; Hsieh, 2000).  By providing an 
alternative source of revenue, aid can relieve pressure on recipient governments to 
establish the efficient policies and institutions necessary for attracting private capital 
(Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001: ch. 1).  The end of U.S. aid – which had been 
generous in the 1950s – is often credited for the Korean and Taiwanese reforms of the 
1960s (e.g. Rodrik, 1996; Brautigam, 2000).   
                                                 
5 See www.mca.gov.  The study by Burnside and Dollar (2000), concluding that aid contributes to growth 
only in good policy environments, is often cited as justification for allocating aid in this way.  Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004) however find that the Burnside-Dollar result is not robust in tests that include 
newly-available data for a few additional countries and years.   5 
Aid can have other unintended, adverse effects on economic policy and public 
sector management.  Friedman (1958) has argued that because most aid goes to 
governments, it tends “to strengthen the role of the government sector in general 
economic activity relative to the private sector.”  Aid is commonly used for patronage 
purposes, by subsidizing employment in the public sector, or in state-operated 
enterprises, as foreign aid can provide funds for government to undertake investments 
that would otherwise be made by private investors.  In Tanzania, for example, large and 
rising aid levels in the 1970s and 1980s helped sustain large government subsidies to 
state-owned enterprises and parastatals. 
As high aid levels increase the rents available to those controlling the 
government, resources devoted to obtaining political influence increase; thus a “pervasive 
consequence of aid has been to promote or exacerbate the politicization of life in aid-
receiving countries” (Bauer, 1984: 38).  In extreme cases, aid may even encourage coup 
attempts and political instability, by making control of the government and aid receipts a 
more valuable prize (Grossman, 1992), with adverse effects for the security of property 
rights. 
Although any negative effects of aid on policies are usually unintended by donors, 
there are some exceptions.  Collier (1997) criticizes the IMF and other donors for 
insisting in some cases that aid recipients increase their tax revenues, often producing 
increases in trade taxes and other distortionary forms of mobilizing revenue in countries 
where the tax base is narrow and administrative capacity is weak. 
Previous empirical literature does not provide a clear answer on whether the 
positive effects of aid on market-oriented policy reform outweigh any negative impacts.  
Burnside and Dollar (2000) find no relationship in their sample of 56 aid recipients 
between aid and their policy index.  As cited in Collier (1997: 57), a World Bank (1994) 
study of 26 African aid recipients found that in most countries where policies had 
improved, aid levels had fallen, and where policies had worsened, aid had increased.  
Vasquez (1998) reports that changes in aid tend to be inversely correlated with changes in 
the Fraser index of economic freedom: where aid is rising (falling), economic freedom 
tends to fall (rise).  Boockmann and Dreher (2003) disaggregate the Fraser index into its 
various components, regressing them on aid from the World Bank and IMF, and a set of 
control variables, using a panel of 85 aid recipients from 1970 to 1997.  In most cases, aid 
variables for both of the IFIs are insignificant.  For the 1990s, however, the number of 
World Bank programs in a country is associated with higher ratings on several freedom 
components (including black market premium, private ownership rights, and viability of 
contracts), but the amount of World Bank credit is negatively associated with these same 
components.  Knack (2001) finds that countries receiving higher levels of aid over the   6 
1982-95 period tend to experience greater declines in the security of private property, as 
measured by a  rule of law index from the International Country Risk Guide.  
These studies either address only limited aspects of market-oriented policies (e.g., 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Knack, 2001), or cover aid only from certain donors 
(Boockmann and Dreher, 2003), and/or do not correct for potential endogeneity of aid 
(e.g. Vasquez, 1998).  The empirical analysis below attempts to offer a more 
comprehensive and rigorous test of the net impact of aid on policy liberalization.   
4.  Data and Statistical Methodology  
The Fraser economic freedom indexes are now updated annually. We use the 
2002 revised dataset,
6 which includes data on five year intervals from 1975-2000.  We 
use data only from 1980 onward, in part to avoid dropping observations (data are missing 
for many more countries in 1975), and in part because the emphasis by the IFIs on 
market-oriented policy reform (including the World Bank’s structural adjustment 
lending) dates to about 1980.   
This version of the index has five broad categories or “areas” of market-oriented 
policies and institutions: Size of Government (Area 1), Legal Structure and Security of 
Property Rights (Area 2), Access to Sound Money (Area 3), Exchange with Foreigners 
(Area 4), and Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business (Area 5).  Each of these five 
areas encompasses a variety of individual components which are assigned a score ranging 
from 0 to 10, with higher values representing greater levels of freedom.  Some of the 
components have several subcomponents.  Detailed description of the components and 
areas which comprise this index are described in Appendix 1.  A score for each of the 
five areas is calculated by the simple average of its various components.  The simple 
average of the five area values then determines the overall economic freedom index (EFI) 
value.  The five areas are equally weighted, but since they contain different numbers of 
components, a component in an area containing fewer components has greater weight in 
the final index value. Incomplete data are a concern for several nations.  For certain 
country-year observations, data are missing on some components in a particular area, so 
the area score is calculated using only partial data.  For other observations, data are 
missing on all components in an area, so no score for the area can be calculated, and the 
overall index may represent the average of only four instead of five areas.  In these cases, 
the index values are inconsistently measured across nations and/or over time.  In effect, 
missing data on components within an area are imputed as the mean of components with 
available data in that area, and missing data on areas are imputed as the mean of the 
remaining areas with available data.  If the various components within each area were 
                                                 
6 This dataset is available on-line at: http://freetheworld.com/download.html .   7 
highly correlated, missing data would be unlikely to affect the area value very much.  
Similarly, if the five areas of the index were all highly correlated, missing data would be 
unlikely to affect substantially the overall economic freedom value.  Correlations among 
the five areas turn out to be modest, however, making it important to replicate results 
based on analyses of the full data set with analyses of the restricted data set of country-
years for which data on all areas are available.
7  
We are interested in analyzing aid’s impact on market-oriented reforms, reflected 
in changes in economic freedom over the 1980-2000 period.  Table 1 makes clear the 
importance of considering not only the overall index value, but the separate areas as well.  
The correlations among changes in the various areas are modest, averaging only .18.  
Changes in Area 1 are orthogonal to changes in Area 2, and the latter is not significantly 
related to changes in any of the other areas.  Of the ten inter-area correlations, only four 
are above .25, and these are the only four that are significantly related to each other at the 
.05 level.
8  Correlations of each area with the overall EFI range from .46 (Area 2) to .73 
(Area 3).   
As shown in Table 2, the average change in the economic freedom index among 
the 80 developing countries in our study is an improvement of 1.1, on the 0-10 scale, with 
13 nations experiencing a net decline in their economic freedom index.  Improvements 
were largest (averaging about 1.5) in Areas 3 (sound money) and 4 (outward orientation), 
and smallest (about 0.3) in Area 5 (regulation of credit, labor and business).  Average 
changes over time for Area 2 should be interpreted most cautiously: its underlying 
components (from the International Country Risk Guide and other sources) are mostly 
subjectively-assessed, ordinal-level variables without specified criteria for each ratings 
level; therefore a rating of 4 (for example) may or may not imply the same level of 
property rights protection in 1985 as in 2000.   
For consistency over time, the overall EFI for each country is computed using 
only those areas and components for which data are available in both 1980 and 2000.
9  
Across countries, however, the change in EFI is measured consistently only if the 
(unmeasured) change in the components with missing data happens to be equal to the 
average change in the areas with available data; in fact, some areas tend to show more 
progress than others.  In addition, when focusing on changes in specific areas of 
                                                 
7 Using an earlier version of the Fraser index, Caudill et al. (2000) report that many components are often 
more highly correlated with other components in different categories than with the components in their own 
categories. 
8 Correlations among levels of the five areas also average only .18 in 1980, but rising to .33 in 2000.  These 
correlations are based only on aid recipients in our main sample, but they change little when all countries 
(including aid donors) in the economic freedom dataset are included. 
9 For example, Uganda has data on all five areas for 2000, but because it has no data on Area 1 for 1980, 
we use only the data for Areas 2-5 in computing its EF index change and initial value.   8 
economic freedom, missing data for that area will drop the country from the analysis 
altogether.  To alleviate concerns over the possibility of data and sample inconsistencies, 
we test for the robustness of our primary findings by also limiting the sample to only 
those nations without any missing area values.  Most of the results hold up under the 
more limited sample, but some important differences emerge.   
Aid is measured by “official development assistance” (ODA) as a percentage of 
gross national income (GNI), using data for the years 1980-99 from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators, which reports data provided by the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee, and collected in turn from each donor agency.  Aid 
(ODA) includes grants, and loans with a grant element of more than 25 percent.  This 
definition excludes most IMF lending, as well as the majority (in most years) of World 
Bank loan volumes, which goes to middle-income borrowers charged near-market rates 
of interest.  Roughly two-thirds of World Bank structural adjustment lending goes to 
middle-income countries and does not qualify as aid.  About one-fourth of World Bank 
aid to low-income countries is in the form of structural adjustment loans. 
Most aid studies (e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000) measure aid as a percentage of 
GNI, but some use aid per capita additionally or instead.  We follow the majority of 
studies in using aid as a percentage of GNI, as it better reflects the leverage donors have 
with respect to convincing recipient governments and their populations to adopt market-
oriented policies.  For example, Israel and Jordan each averaged about $250 per capita in 
aid in recent decades, but aid averaged less than 2% of GNI for Israel and more than 16% 
for Jordan.  Donors are likely to have far more leverage over policy when their funds 
account for one-sixth of a recipient’s GNI than when they account for one-fiftieth.  Aid 
per capita and aid as a percentage of GNI, each averaged over the 1980-99 period, are 
correlated in our main sample at only .43 (or .51 using the log of aid per capita), 
reflecting the divergence between GNI and population (i.e. some aid recipients have 
much higher per capita incomes than others).  We note below how our results vary if aid 
per capita is used in the analysis instead of the more appropriate aid as a percentage of 
GNI measure. 
Control variables include the initial (1980) economic freedom value, average 
annual per capita income growth over the 1980-2000 period (based on purchasing power 
parity income data from the World Development Indicators), linguistic fractionalization, 
and civil liberties.  Initial economic freedom captures any regression-to-the-mean effect, 
as countries with higher values in 1980 have less room for improvement than those with 
lower initial values.  Rapid growth may disrupt, or reflect the absence of, special interests 
that tend to block reforms.  Controlling for growth may also capture any tendency for the 
subjectively-assessed components of the index (mainly in area 2, but also in some others)   9 
to be inferred in part from observed economic performance.
10  Growth is obviously 
endogenous to market-oriented policy reform.  Using Granger-causality tests, Farr, Lord 
and Wolfenbarger (1998) find evidence for mutual causality between levels of GDP per 
capita and levels of the Fraser index, and Dawson (2003) concludes the level of the 
Fraser index Granger-causes growth, while changes in the index are jointly determined 
with growth.  We therefore show below how results are affected by excluding growth 
from the regression.  Linguistic fractionalization is included, using data from Alesina et 
al. (2003), as polarized societies may find it more difficult to implement efficient policy 
reforms, even in the face of economic crisis (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Easterly and 
Levine, 1997). 
We control for the initial level of civil liberties, and for the change over the 
period, using data from Freedom House.
11  Theory and previous evidence do not predict a 
particular sign on civil liberties.  Giving political voice to broader interests may slow 
reform in some contexts but speed it up in others.  Of their 10 African case studies, 
Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001: 11) note that the “two strongest reformers—
Rawlings [in Ghana] and Museveni [in Uganda]—came to power through military 
coups.”  On the other hand, de Haan and Sturm (2003) find larger improvements in the 
EF index (1975-90) where the level of political freedom is greater, and Dollar and 
Svensson (1998) find that democratically elected government increases the likelihood of 
success for World Bank structural adjustment programs over the period 1980-95.   Civil 
liberties are shown by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) and Farr, Lord and Wolfenbarger 
(1998) to be influenced positively by per capita income; for our sample over the 1980-
2000 period, however, growth is correlated with the change in civil liberties at only .01.  
Aid, the key independent variable of interest, is potentially endogenous, as donors 
may direct either more or less aid toward reforming countries.
12  The World Bank’s IDA 
allocations (accounting for about 10% of ODA) are determined in part by internal, 
subjective assessments of the quality of policies and institutions, potentially creating a 
positive bias in the impact of aid on policy liberalization.  The OLS coefficient for aid 
would capture not only the effect of any positive incentive to reform to qualify for an 
increased allocation, but also would reflect the impact of policy reform, undertaken for 
other reasons (e.g. response to crisis, or economic success of other reformers) but still 
                                                 
10 Hanson (2003) criticizes the construction of the economic freedom index, and others similar to it, on the 
belief that components were chosen for inclusion based on the success of the wealthier nations. 
11 See www.freedomhouse.org.  We reverse the 1-7 scale so that higher values indicate greater civil 
liberties.  Initial level and change are correlated at -.58, and both are significant at higher levels when 
entered together than if either one is included alone.  Results reported in the tables are very similar when 
the Freedom House political freedoms measure is substituted for civil liberties.  
12 Bauer (1981: 91) observed that aid is like champagne: “in success you deserve it, in failure you need it” 
(quoted in Vasquez, 1998: 275).     10 
rewarded with higher aid.  There are several reasons to believe the positive bias in the 
aid-reform relationship implied by these allocation systems to be minor.  First, 
allocations do not always translate one-to-one into aid commitments, and commitments in 
turn do not always translate one-to-one into disbursements.  Aid in the analysis is 
measured as actual disbursements.  Second, most donors do not place the same emphasis 
on quality of policies and institutions as the IDA allocation system, and even IDA 
allocations were not well targeted toward recipients with better policies for most of the 
1980-2000 period (Easterly, 2002; Dollar and Levin, 2004).  Third, the IDA system 
rewards countries for a high level of policy quality, while our dependent variable is 
change in the quality of policy.  In any event, results reported below are unaffected by 
subtracting out IDA aid. 
There are likely other cases where donors direct aid toward countries with 
improving policy environments, including some that tend to follow the World Bank’s 
lead.  On the other hand, there are likely many other cases where donors focus their aid 
on countries with poor and/or worsening policy environments, either as an inducement to 
reform, or as a response to humanitarian crises in poor-performing countries.
13  On 
balance, it is a matter of conjecture whether the net effect of all sources of bias would be 
positive or negative.   
To correct for endogeneity concerns, we instrument for aid in two-stage least-
squares regressions using initial (1980) levels of per capita income, adult illiteracy, child 
mortality, and (log of) population, with data from the World Development Indicators.  
Appendix 2 reports the first-stage regression.  Not only are each of these four instruments 
significant predictors of aid levels, but collectively they explain a sizeable fraction of 
variation in aid.  As seen by comparing the two columns in the Appendix 2 table, the 
other second-stage regressors explain only 20% of the variation in aid in the absence of 
the four exogenous instruments; with their inclusion 67% of the variation in aid is 
explained. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the 76 countries included in our base 
sample; Appendix 3 lists these countries, and reports for each one the change and initial 
level of the EF index, and aid as a percentage of gross national income averaged over the 
1980-2000 period. 
5. Results  
Our primary regressions are presented in Table 3.  In column 1 the dependent 
variable is the overall EF index, representing the average freedom value of the five areas.  
The coefficient for initial EF is negative and statistically significant, implying that 
                                                 
13 Including growth in our tests is a partial control for this latter effect.    11 
nations with greater initial “economic freedom” tended to worsen over time, with a nearly 
three-quarter point decline for each unit increase in the initial EF index value.  Growth 
has a small and statistically insignificant impact on changes in the EF index: even the 
difference between the highest sample growth rate (.08, for China) to the worst (-.056, for 
Democratic Republic of Congo) implies an increase of less than a third of a point in EFI.   
Policies improve more in countries that are less fractionalized by primary 
language.  The linguistic fractionalization index varies from 0 (El Salvador, Haiti, Korea, 
and Rwanda) to .9 (Togo, followed closely by Cameroon and Kenya); this difference is 
associated with a predicted improvement in EFI of nearly half a point more for 
homogeneous El Salvador relative to heterogeneous Togo.
14   
Both the initial civil liberties value and its change over time are positively and 
significantly related to policy improvements.  The difference in initial civil liberties 
between the lowest value of 1 (Malawi and Republic of Congo) and highest value of 7 
(Barbados and Costa Rica) is associated with a nearly full-point greater increase in EFI.  
Each 1-point improvement in civil liberties over the period is associated with a nearly 
quarter-point increase in EFI; in the sample Venezuela has the largest decline (3 points) 
in civil liberties while Benin, Korea, Malawi South Africa and Uruguay show the largest 
increases (4 points).  
Aid on balance is found to discourage policy reform.  Each percentage point 
increase in aid as a share of national income slows the improvement in EF by .04.  
Comparing a country receiving virtually no aid (e.g. Korea) to one receiving 25% of its 
GNI in aid (Nicaragua; Guinea-Bissau is highest at 51%), the former’s improvement in 
EFI is predicted to be a full point higher. 
Columns 2-6 respectively replace EFI with the five separate policy areas. Aid is 
found to discourage policy reform for areas 3 (sound money) and 5 (regulation).  The aid 
coefficient is also large in the case of Area 2 (property rights), consistent with results in 
Knack (2001), who concludes aid is harmful to security of property rights, using 
somewhat different time periods and measures of property rights from those used here.  
However, aid is significant only at the .16 level in the Area 2 regression, which has the 
smallest sample size among all five areas.  The overidentification tests (reported in the 
bottom row of the table) generally support the validity of the instruments for aid, 
including for the EF index regression, but not in the regressions for Areas 3 and 4. 
                                                 
14 Alesina et al. (2003) also construct indexes of religious and “ethnic” fractionalization, correlated 
respectively with linguistic fractionalization in our sample at .28 and .67.  Religious fractionalization has a 
negative but not significant coefficient if added or substituted for the language variable.  “Ethnic” 
fractionalization produces results very similar to linguistic; we use the latter because “ethnicity” is not 
clearly defined by Alesina et al. (2003).  Among the three indexes, linguistic fractionalization best predicts 
ethnic tensions across countries, using subjective assessments from the International Country Risk Guide 
(at www.prsgroup.com).      12 
Among the other regressors, the initial EF area value is significant in every case.  
Growth always has a positive sign, but approaches significance only in the case of Area 2 
(property rights).
15  Fractionalization is most strongly associated with slower reform in 
Area 4 (openness).  Initial civil liberties are most strongly associated with reform in 
Areas 1 (government size) and 5 (regulation), while the change in civil liberties is most 
associated with progress in Areas 3-5.  
Missing data may complicate comparisons of the effect of aid on the different 
areas.  For example, the Area 3 regression includes 15 more countries than the Area 2 
regression.  To facilitate comparison, the regressions presented in Table 3 were re-run 
using the limited sample of 51 nations with scores for every area.  Aid’s impact in this 
sample is similar, as shown in Table 4.  The negative effect of aid strengthens somewhat 
for Area 2, and the significance of aid for Area 3 weakens in this smaller sample, despite 
no change in the coefficient compared to the same regression in Table 3.   
Our findings indicate that aid more often than not discourages market-oriented 
policy and institutional reform.  The emphasis on liberal, pro-market reform reflects the 
general belief that it is necessary for growth to take place.  However, as explained in 
section 2, empirical studies suggest that economic growth is more sensitive to some EF 
areas than to others (Carlsson and Lundstrom 2002).  If aid tends to discourage reform in 
the policy areas that matter less to growth, our findings on the adverse consequences of 
aid should be of somewhat less concern.  To identify which policy areas appear to have 
the strongest growth effects, we regressed per capita income growth (1980-2000) on the 
initial (1980) values of each of the five policy areas, controlling for catch-up 
opportunities via the inclusion of initial GDP per capita as a sixth regressor.  As a partial 
control for heteroskedasticity, the regression was estimated by weighted least squares, 
with results presented in Appendix 4.  We find that growth is associated with more 
market-oriented policies in Areas 1, 2, and 3, but with less market-oriented policies in 
Area 5.  The coefficient for Area 4 is also negative, but small and insignificant. Thus, aid 
appears most likely to harm growth through slowing reform in Areas 2 and 3 (property 
rights and sound money).  Aid may tend to increase growth by slowing reform in Area 5 
(regulation), the one policy area for which more “economic freedom” is associated with 
slower growth in our 51-country sample. 
Table 5 reports results on the EF index for several changes in sample or 
specification.  Equations 1 and 2 address the potential objection that the $15,000 per 
capita income threshold for inclusion in our base sample is arbitrary.  Equation 1 adds 
seven high-income aid recipients to our base sample of 76 countries with incomes below 
                                                 
15 Area 2 is the one area measured mostly using subjective measures; these subjective assessments 
conceivably are influenced by recent growth performance.     13 
$15,000.
16  Equation 2 on the other hand deletes 22 middle-income countries from our 
base sample with incomes above $4,000.  In both cases, the aid coefficient increases in 
magnitude (from –.04 to -.06) and significance, relative to the corresponding regression 
in Table 3 (equation 1).   
Equation 3 considers only those 43 countries, from our base sample of 76, with 
aid exceeding 3% of GNI on average.  Despite the resulting reduction in variation in 
aid/GNI in this  sub-sample, the aid coefficient increases in magnitude (from -.04 to -.07) 
and significance.  We also examined the sensitivity of findings to influential observations 
(results not shown in tables).  Guinea-Bissau easily has the highest aid/GNI value in the 
sample at 51%, and is also by far the worst policy performer, with a decline of 2.8 points 
on EFI.  Deleting this observation reduces the magnitude of the aid coefficient from -.04 
to -.03, and it is significant only at the .07 level.  Results on aid for Area 3 in Table 4 also 
weaken slightly; other results are unaffected as Guinea-Bissau is not included in the other 
four areas regressions.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are many observations 
with aid levels below 1% of GNI; of these Argentina shows the largest improvement in 
EFI (2.8).  Its deletion however has virtually no impact on aid’s coefficient or 
significance.  Results also change little if five micro-states (Belize, Barbados, Bahrain, 
Fiji and Gabon, all with population under 750,000 in 1980) are deleted from the sample.  
Equations 4 and 5 retain the base 76-country sample but alter the specification.  
Equation 4 omits the endogenous regressor, growth in per capita income, with very little 
impact on the estimated effects of aid or other variables.  Equation 5 adds a dummy 
variable for Sub-Saharan Africa, where policy reform faces particularly daunting 
challenges (Johnson, 2004).  The EFI averaged only 4.7 in 1980 for the 29 African 
countries in our base sample, compared to 5.2 for the other 47, and they also improved 
less on average between 1980 and 2000: 0.8 for Africa, and 1.2 for countries in other 
regions.  They also average 12% on aid, compared to less than 4% for the other countries.  
The aid variable potentially is capturing the effects of some omitted Africa-specific 
variable.  The Africa dummy variable in equation 5, however, falls far short of attaining 
significance, and its inclusion has little impact on the aid variable.
17  In equation 6, in 
fact, we show that aid’s effect in a regression including only the 29 African countries is 
similar to its impact in the full sample, conclusively demonstrating that aid is not 
spuriously capturing an Africa-specific phenomenon of slower policy reform.  On the 
other hand, linguistic fractionalization becomes insignificant when the Africa dummy is 
added (equation 5), and in the Africa sub-sample (equation 6).  These results suggest that 
                                                 
16 These 7 countries, exceeding $15,000 in per capita income (purchasing power parity, 1995 dollars) in 
either 1980 or 2000, include The Bahamas, Cyprus, Israel, Kuwait, Malta, Singapore, and the UAE.   
17 When a complete set of regional dummies was tested, no significant differences among any regions 
emerged.      14 
the significant effect of fractionalization in the base sample reflects primarily cross-
regional differences; Africa averages .69 on fractionalization compared to only .29 for the 
other 47 countries. 
We also experimented with other regressors, none of which turned out to be 
significant, or to alter results on the aid variable.  Economic crisis is often credited as a 
source of policy reform, as it can upset political equilibria previously blocking the 
adoption or implementation of reforms (e.g. Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001: ch.1; 
Bambaci, Saront and Tommasi, 2002).  Crisis can be measured only very crudely when 
examining only the net outcome of all reform occurring over a 20-year period, so it is 
unsurprising that our measures had little explanatory power.  We tested three proxies for 
crisis: (1) changes in the terms of trade between 1980 and 2000, (2) terms of trade 
volatility during the period, and (3) debt default, measured as the number of Paris Club 
debt re-schedulings.
18  Of these, only a dummy variable for having re-scheduled debt at 
least once is even marginally significant, with a coefficient of +.37.  Interpretation of this 
finding is not straightforward: debt re-scheduling is not only an indicator of crisis, but 
also of an aid relationship, as countries benefiting from re-scheduling agreements are 
required to have a current program with the IMF committing them to implement reforms. 
We also tested several political economy variables from Beck et al. (2000), 
following  work by Myerson (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2004, 2002) showing that 
electoral rules and other political institutions can affect government spending and 
corruption levels.  A plausible hypothesis, for example, is that reform would be hampered 
by presence of a chief executive from a left-wing party, or presence of a coalition 
government.  However, the share of years from 1980-2000 in which a country had 
coalition government, or an executive from a left-wing party, proved to be unrelated to 
changes in EFI.
19  Similarly, the average level of party fractionalization in parliament 
overall, and in the government coalition in parliament, were insignificant.  Parliamentary 
district magnitude, proportional representation, and presidential systems also had no 
relation to policy reform in our sample.  Nor did the addition of any of these variables 
affect the strength of the estimated relationship between aid and policy reform.  
Moreover, results described in this paragraph are unaffected by deleting non-democracies 
from the sample, or by omitting the civil liberties measures from the equation. 
                                                 
18 See www.clubdeparis.org.  The number varied in our base sample from 0 (for 27 countries) to 14 
(Senegal), with a mean of 3.   
19 When left-wing governments advocate market-liberalizing reforms, on efficiency-enhancing grounds, 
they are likely to have greater credibility with the public than right-wing governments, which many voters 
might suspect to advocate reform purely for ideological reasons whatever the stated objective (Cukierman 
and Tommasi, 1998).  Examples include early 1980s Ghana under Jerry Rawlings (Devarajan, Dollar, and 
Holmgren, 2001: ch. 2), and early 1990s Argentina under the Peronist Carlos Menem (Bambaci, Saront and 
Tommasi, 2002: 81).      15 
Equation 7 of Table 5 substitutes (the log of) aid per capita for aid as a percentage 
of GNI.  The coefficient remains negative, but is not significant.  This finding may 
suggest that high aid levels in middle-income countries – where aid per capita is high but 
aid/GNI is low – are less likely to inhibit reform as in poorer countries.  When we retain 
aid/GNI, but drop the poorest countries from the sample (10 have per capita incomes 
under $1,000 in 1980), we also find the aid coefficient negative but insignificant.  
Our final investigations, reported in Table 6, compare aid’s impact before and 
after the end of the Cold War.  Aid allocation decisions by the U.S. and other donors 
during the Cold War were often dominated by strategic considerations, potentially at the 
expense of market-liberalizing policy reform, as corrupt regimes such as Mobutu’s in 
Congo-Zaire were propped up by aid.  The 1990s also witnessed an increased donor 
emphasis on the quality of governance, including protection of property rights, reflected 
mainly in Area 2 of the Fraser index.  Moreover, the IFIs may have learned from some of 
their early mistakes with structural adjustment lending and conditionality; ratings by the 
World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department show large increases from the 1980s to 
the 1990s in the percentage of adjustment loans with “satisfactory” or better outcomes 
(Killick, 2004; World Bank, 2004).  Whether for these or other reasons, the 1990s saw 
much more reform than the 1980s: the mean change in EFI for our 76-country base 
sample is only .17 for the 1980s, but .85 for the 1990s.
20  Moreover, although countries 
receiving high aid levels as a share of GNI in the 1980s also tended to be recipients of 
large aid volumes in the 1990s (the correlation is .82), this is not true for reform: the 
change in EFI across decades is actually negatively correlated (-.20, significant at .10).  A 
final reason for breaking the period into decades is to permit the inclusion of many ex-
Communist countries that embarked on the transition to market economies and began 
receiving aid from the West in the 1990s.   
Table 6 presents regression results for the change in EFI separately by decade, 
adjusting all variables accordingly.  As in the 1980-2000 tests, the aid coefficient is 
negative and highly significant for the 1980-90 period.  For the same set of countries, 
however, aid is not significantly related to the change in EFI in the 1990s.  Other notable 
differences across decades are that civil liberties and growth mattered more in the 1990s 
than in the 1980s.    
Equation 3 also considers the 1990-2000 period, but adds 13 ex-Soviet bloc 
countries which abandoned socialism and became recipients of substantial aid in that 
                                                 
20 All five areas showed large improvements on average in the base sample in the 1990s, particularly in 
areas 3 (sound money) and 4 (openness).  In the 1980s average ratings improved only for areas 1 
(government size) and 4.       16 
decade.
21  The average increase in EFI among these 13 in the 1990s was 1.15, compared 
to 0.85 for the other 76 countries.  The addition of these 13 countries in equation 3 further 
weakens the aid coefficient, and further strengthens the coefficient on income growth.   
Equation 4 adds an EU accession dummy, which has a positive and significant 
coefficient of .66, indicating that the carrot of membership generated more extensive 
policy reform for the seven new EU members (admitted in May 2004) in our sample, 
other things equal.
22  There is potentially reciprocal causation, however, as reforms 
undertaken for other reasons (e.g. in response to crisis) could enhance the chances for 
membership.   
6.  Discussion  
Our results show that over the 1980-2000 period, countries receiving higher levels 
of aid were less likely to adopt market-oriented reforms than those receiving low aid 
levels.  Although this finding may be welcomed by aid skeptics who believe a “world 
without development aid” would experience more “real reform” toward market-oriented 
policies (Vasquez, 1998: 276),  several important qualifications to our work suggest a 
more favorable view of at least some donor programs.      
First, our decade analyses are consistent with other evidence (e.g. Koeberle, 2003: 
253) that donors’ attempts to influence policy have become more effective (or less 
counterproductive) over time.  Donors now more readily acknowledge the primacy of 
domestic political economy factors in determining the direction and pace of reform 
(World Bank, 2004), and recognize that aid is likely to facilitate reform only where a 
significant commitment exists within the government.  Technical support by donors is 
important, but only where there is a well-articulated demand for it.  Conditionality is 
often welcomed by technocrats in the early stages of reform, to obtain clear decisions 
from the political leadership and to signal publicly the seriousness of reform (Devarajan, 
Dollar, and Holmgren, 2001: 30).  Once reform measures are well established, however, 
donors should abandon conditionality so that local ownership and management is clear.   
Second, the impact of donors should not be equated with the impact of aid 
volumes.  Policy advice can be effective in countries with small aid programs, measured 
as a share of GNI.  Examples include China and the Dominican Republic (World Bank, 
2004: 18, 27-28; Mallaby, 2004: 410).  Key economic officials in reforming countries 
                                                 
21 These countries are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Russia and Ukraine.  
22 These seven include Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic.  
Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia are also new members but are not included in our sample.  Alternative 
dummies that include Bulgaria and Romania (on track for membership in 2007), and Croatia and Turkey 
(negotiating for membership) have positive but insignificant coefficients.      17 
often benefited from donor-sponsored overseas training programs which account for only 
a tiny fraction of aid volumes (World Bank, 1998: 55).  
Third, donors’ impact may go beyond country-specific aid and advice.  The IFIs 
and other donors disseminate ideas globally, potentially contributing to the spread of 
market-oriented reforms through provision of intellectual public goods.  For example, 
most of the data underlying the Fraser Institute’s index, and which are heavily relied on 
in numerous academic studies on the growth effects of economic policy, are generated by 
the IMF.  The World Bank and IMF are the largest producers and distributors of 
advocacy pieces for market-oriented policy and institutional reforms, in their numerous 
reports and working papers.  In recent decades, according to Mallaby (2004: 71), “…the 
Bank’s annual World Development Report often established the accepted wisdom among 
development thinkers.  Commentators outside the Bank spent much of their time reacting 
to World Bank ideas and citing World Bank data.”  The World Bank maintains web sites 
designed for use by staff, government officials and NGO reform advocates which 
disseminate “best practice” knowledge on reform in numerous policy areas such as legal 
and judicial reform, anti-corruption, and tax policy and administration.  A Bank-
commissioned survey of 2,600 “opinion leaders” in government, academia, civil society, 
trade unions and the private sector, conducted in 2002-2003 in 35 developing and 13 
industrial countries, supports the effectiveness of these activities.  Most respondents 
reported that World Bank publications substantially influenced their thinking on 
development issues, that the Bank was effective in contributing to the economic debate in 
their countries, and that it was “an excellent source of research, analysis and knowledge” 
including data on issues relevant to their countries.  Responses were even more favorable 
in less-developed than in industrialized countries (Princeton Survey Research Associates, 
2003). 
Fourth, donors often have other objectives instead of or in addition to policy 
reform to stimulate private sector development.  Education and health policy, for 
example, are not reflected in the Fraser index.  Non-policy objectives, including 
humanitarian, gender equity, environmental, and bilateral donors’ foreign policy goals, 
may also justify aid programs.  The effectiveness of aid in meeting many of these goals 
has not been sufficiently analyzed, but donors may view their aid programs as successful 
on these terms even if they are counterproductive in generating market-friendly policy 
reforms. 
This study has analyzed the impact of all ODA on market-oriented policy reform.  
Some forms of aid, from some donors, may be more effective (or at least less harmful) 
than others.  Further research could disaggregate aid by type (technical assistance, project 
lending and budget support), or by donor agency (World Bank, IMF, UN agencies, 
various bilaterals), or by sector (e.g. aid for banking and financial services, or for   18 
strengthening civil society and public sector accountability and capacity), to examine 
potential differences in their impact on market-liberalizing reform.  Further research 
could also examine the impact of financial flows other than ODA, including non-
concessional lending by aid agencies.  Finally, the impact of other factors, including 
economic crises, changes in government and other political economy variables, could be 
investigated more thoroughly, by examining 5-year periods instead of the 10 and 20-year 
periods analyzed in this study. 
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Table 1 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix: changes in economic freedom, 1980-2000 
 
  EF Index  AREA1  AREA2  AREA3  AREA4 
AREA1  0.54*  
(73) 
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  Summary statistics for main sample (N=76) 
 
  Mean   Std. Dev.   Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Economic Freedom Index, change  1.03  1.04  -2.83  3.45 
Economic Freedom Index, initial  4.97  0.96  1.70  7.31 
Aid/GNI (percent)  6.88  8.32  0.03  51.16 
Growth  0.01  0.02  -0.056  0.081 
Linguistic fractionalization  0.44  0.33  0.00  0.92 
Civil liberties, initial  3.49  1.48  1  7 
Civil liberties, change  0.76  1.51  -3  4 
GDP, initial  3375  2834  462  14830 
Child mortality rate, initial  126.95  74.29  18  336 
Illiteracy rate, initial  42.3  24.8  1.17  92.05 
Population, initial (millions)  39.08  136.52  0.15  981.24 
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Table 3 
Aid and Economic Freedom, 1980-2000 
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T-statistics below coefficient estimates.  Exogenous instruments for aid include initial-
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Table 4 
Aid and Economic Freedom, 1980-2000  
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T-statistics below coefficient estimates.  Exogenous instruments for aid include initial-
year values of per capita income, child mortality, illiteracy and population. 
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Table 5 
  Aid and Economic Freedom index, 1980-2000  
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T-statistics below coefficient estimates.  Exogenous instruments for aid include initial-
year values of per capita income, child mortality, illiteracy and population. 
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Table 6 
  Aid and Economic Freedom index, by decade 
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T-statistics below coefficient estimates.  Exogenous instruments for aid include initial-
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Appendix 1: Areas and Components of the Economic Freedom Index 
 
Area 1: Size of Government: Expenditures, Taxes, and Enterprises 
Component A. General government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption 
Component B. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
Component C. Government enterprises and investment as a percentage of GDP 
Component D. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold to which it applies) 
Subcomponent i.  Top marginal income tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies) 
Subcomponent ii.  Top marginal income and payroll tax rate (and income threshold at which it 
applies) 
 
Area 2: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
Component A. Judicial independence: the judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by 
the government or parties in disputes 
Component B. Impartial courts: A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge 
the legality of government actions or regulation  
Component C. Protection of intellectual property  
Component D. Military interference in rule of law and the political process  
Component E. Integrity of the legal system 
 
Area 3: Access to Sound Money 
Component A. Average annual growth of the money supply in the last five years minus average 
annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years 
Component B. Standard inflation variability in the last five years 
Component C. Recent inflation rate 
Component D. Freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad 
 
Area 4: Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners 
Component A.  Taxes on international trade 
Subcomponent i. Revenue from taxes on international trade as a percentage of exports plus imports 
Subcomponent ii. Mean tariff rate 
Subcomponent iii. Standard deviation of tariff rates 
Component B.   Regulatory trade barriers 
Subcomponent i. Hidden import barriers: No barriers other than published tariffs and quotas 
Subcomponent ii. Costs of importing: the combined effect of import tariffs, license fees, bank fees, 
and the time required for administrative red-tape 
Component C. Actual size of trade sector compared to expected size 
Component D. Difference between official exchange rate and black market rate 
Component E. International capital market controls 
Subcomponent i. Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital 
markets 
Subcomponent ii. Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with 
foreigners—index of capital controls among 13 IMF categories 
 
Area 5: Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business 
Component A. Credit Market Regulations 
Subcomponent i. Ownership of banks: percentage of deposits held in privately owned banks 
Subcomponent ii. Competition: domestic banks face competition from foreign banks 
Subcomponent iii. Extension of credit: percentage of credit extended to private sector  
Subcomponent iv. Avoidance of interest rate controls and regulations that lead to negative real 
interest rates   29 
Subcomponent v. Interest rate controls: interest rate controls on bank deposits and/or loans are 
freely determined by the market  
Component B. Labor Market Regulations 
Subcomponent i. Impact of minimum wage: the minimum wage, set by law, has little impact on 
wages because it is too low or not obeyed  
Subcomponent ii. Hiring and firing practices: hiring and firing practices of companies are determined 
by private contract 
Subcomponent iii. Share of labor force whose wages are set by centralized collective bargaining 
Subcomponent iv. Unemployment Benefits: the unemployment benefits system preserves the 
incentive to work 
Subcomponent v. Use of conscripts to obtain military personnel 
Component C. Business Regulations 
Subcomponent i. Price controls: extent to which businesses are free to set their own prices 
Subcomponent ii. Administrative conditions and new businesses: administrative procedures are an 
important obstacle to starting a new business 
Subcomponent iii. Time with government bureaucracy: senior management spends a substantial 
amount of time dealing with government bureaucracy 
Subcomponent iv. Starting a new business: starting a new business is generally easy 
Subcomponent v. Irregular payments: irregular, additional payments connected with import and 
export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loan 
applications are very rare 
   30 
Appendix 2 
  Aid, 1980-2000  

























Avg. annual growth 



























































































T-statistics below coefficient estimates.    31 
Appendix 3: Countries in base sample  
 
Country     EF change  initial EF   aid(%GNI) 
 
Algeria              0.61       3.89        0.50 
Argentina            2.83       4.35        0.09 
Bahrain              0.32       7.31        2.13 
Bangladesh           1.83       3.69        5.24 
Barbados             0.06       5.66        0.53 
Belize               0.35       5.82        6.58 
Benin                0.49       5.17       11.24 
Bolivia              2.42       4.28        8.75 
Botswana             1.56       5.46        5.50 
Brazil               1.05       4.33        0.05 
Burundi              1.00       4.16       17.41 
Cameroon            -0.35       5.77        4.24 
Central Afr. Rep.    0.48       4.64       14.34 
Chad                 1.31       4.35       13.99 
Chile                2.26       5.22        0.17 
China                1.57       3.93        0.42 
Colombia             0.78       4.72        0.23 
Congo, Dem. Rep.     0.25       3.43        4.79 
Congo, Rep.          0.14       4.76        8.30 
Costa Rica           1.44       5.82        3.02 
Cote d’Ivoire        0.90       5.32        5.88 
Dominican Rep.       0.87       5.89        1.47 
Ecuador             -0.61       5.85        0.08 
Egypt                1.98       4.68        5.63 
El Salvador          3.02       4.41        6.09 
Fiji                 0.51       5.64        3.06 
Gabon                1.09       4.17        2.30 
Ghana                2.69       2.93        8.12 
Guatemala           -0.10       6.48        1.70 
Guinea-Bissau       -2.83       5.43       51.16 
Guyana               2.69       3.71       19.78 
Haiti                1.14       5.26        9.98 
Honduras             0.49       5.83        8.67 
India                0.84       5.24        0.71 
Indonesia            0.85       5.11        1.22 
Iran                 1.05       4.01        0.10 
Jamaica              2.68       4.24        4.35 
Jordan               1.94       5.26       12.28 
Kenya                1.44       5.12        8.64 
Korea                1.22       5.76        0.03 
Madagascar           1.02       4.33       11.04 
Malawi              -0.27       4.85       21.93 
Malaysia            -0.22       6.88        0.45 
Mali                -0.20       5.84       18.98 
Mauritius            2.12       5.28        2.45 
Mexico               0.64       5.52        0.08 
Morocco              1.38       4.54        3.17 
Namibia              2.30       1.7         4.88 
Nepal                0.20       5.68        9.65 
Nicaragua            2.51       4.02       24.93 
Niger                0.11       5.37       15.05 
Nigeria              1.51       3.87        0.59 
Oman                 1.35       5.85        0.82     32 
Pakistan             0.84       4.60        2.55 
Panama               1.22       5.96        0.88 
Papua New Guinea    -0.35       6.25       10.40 
Paraguay             0.34       6.51        1.42 
Peru                 3.04       3.78        1.34 
Philippines          1.76       5.30        1.70 
Rwanda              -0.01       5.28       20.38 
Senegal              0.60       5.20       13.29 
Sierra Leone         0.55       5.05       14.40 
South Africa         1.02       5.70        0.30 
Sri Lanka            1.12       4.94        6.91 
Syria                0.92       4.04        4.09 
Tanzania             0.98       4.80       19.70 
Thailand             0.60       6.02        0.86 
Togo                 0.83       4.19       12.12 
Trinidad & Tobago    1.96       5.06        0.25 
Tunisia              1.07       4.99        2.12 
Turkey               2.11       3.71        0.43 
Uganda               3.45       3.16       11.66 
Uruguay              0.60       5.88        0.29 
Venezuela           -0.80       6.56        0.05 
Zambia               1.34       5.08       20.12 
Zimbabwe             0.15       4.65        4.88   33 
Appendix 4 
Economic Freedom and Growth, 1980-2000 














































Mean, dep. var.  
 
2.16 
   
F-statistic
   27.34 
 





T-statistics below coefficients.  Estimation by Weighted Least Squares. 
 
 
 